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Emotional mechanisms of social (re)production 
 
Since the 1960s various currents within social theory have been undermining the 
functionalist and structuralist conception of the human agent as a passive automaton 
moved by obscure forces. While the emerging picture emphasizes the part played by 
cognition, implicit skill and explicit knowledge, much less attention has been paid to the 
role of emotions in the active production and reproduction of the social world. The 
specialized sub-field known as the sociology of emotions has brought to sociological 
attention the topic of emotions but has been mostly preoccupied with how social 
structures of various kinds determine or constrain situated emotions. The aim of this 
programmatic article is to demonstrate the theoretical plausibility and the empirical 
viability of research on emotional mechanisms of social production and reproduction. On 
the basis of a critical reappropriation of the theory of structuration and interaction ritual 
theory, face-work and sacred-object establishment (or “enshrinement”) arise as 
mechanisms of social production and reproduction to which situated emotions are 
inherently constitutive. The conclusion points to the need for social theory to develop a 
concept of motivation integrating the “pulling” and “pushing” duality of emotional 
intentions as expressed in situated action. 
 
Mécanismes sociaux de (re)production sociale 
Depuis les années 1960 plusieurs courants de théorie sociale remettent en question la 
conception fonctionnaliste et structuraliste qui fait de l’agent humain un automate passif 
mu par des forces obscures. Si la vision qui en résulte souligne le rôle de la cognition, 
qu’il s’agisse d’habileté implicite et de connaissance explicite, bien moins d’attention a 
été consacrée au rôle des émotions dans la production et reproduction active du monde 
social. Le sous-champ spécialisé connu sous le nom de sociologie des émotions a attiré 
l’attention sociologique sur le sujet des émotions mais elle s’est principalement occupé 
d’examiner comment des structures sociales diverses déterminent ou contraignent les 
émotions. Le but de cet article programmatique est de démontrer la plausibilité théorique 
et la viabilité empirique de la réalisation de recherches sur des mécanismes émotionnels 
de production et de reproduction sociale. Sur la base d’une réappropriation critique de la 
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théorie de la structuration et de la théorie des rituels d’interaction, le travail de figuration 
(face-work) et l’établissement d’objets sacrés (ou “consécration”) émergent comme des 
mécanismes de production et de reproduction sociale pour lesquels les émotions sont 
inhéremment constitutifs. La conclusion invite à développer un concept de motivation 
tenant compte de la dualité pulling-pushing des intentions émotionnelles telles qu’elles 
s’expriment dans l’action située. 
 
At least since the 1960s various currents of social theory have seriously put to task 
explanations of the social world based on a conception of the human agent as a passive 
entity moved by obscure forces1. Currents such as ethnomethodology, hermeneutics, 
interpretive sociology, and the ethnography of face-to-face communication have brought 
to light the subtle and pervasive skills that human agents deploy in their day-to-day 
activities in order to produce and reproduce the apparent stability of the social world. 
These currents have been undeniably effective in converting large sections of the 
academic community to the cause of an active conception of the human agent. But the 
understanding of the agents’ activity has remained somewhat restricted to cognition, 
whether it refers to the ability to give explicit reasons for one’s actions, or to mostly 
implicit procedural knowledge enabling the agent to smoothly “go on” in everyday 
activities.  
While the inclusion of such dimensions of knowledge represent an important progress 
toward a more realistic understanding of agency, social theory has not paid much 
attention to an equally important dimension of the human agent: emotion. Surprisingly, 
even within currents that defend a picture of the active agent, talk of emotions not rarely 
raises the same sort of objection as the ones that “structural” social scientists used to 
address to the pioneers of a conception of the active agent: the topic is trivial, the topic 
pertains to psychology, the topic has no interesting implication for social theory. The 
force of such objections is difficult to discern, but the fact that the topic of emotions 
encounters a certain amount of resistance among those that could be expected to best 
understand its relevance is perhaps revealing of the vast implications that the systematic 
                                                           
1 I thank Laurence Kaufmann, Albert Ogien, and Christian von Scheve for their useful comments on the 
first version of this article. 
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inclusion of emotions can have for our model of the social agent, and for social theory 
more generally. The present article sets out to explore some of the ways in which an 
understaning of the social agent as fundamentally emotional can help to illuminate some 
important social processes. 
It would be unfair, of course, to state that sociology has entirely neglected emotions, for 
since at least the end of the 1970s a whole corpus of theoretical and empirical works have 
more or less explicitly contributed to the formation of what is currently known as the 
sociology of emotions (J. Turner and Stets 2005). But it is equally necessary to 
acknowledge that this emerging sub-field, mostly an American endeavor2, has been 
largely dominated by a marked “structural” orientation. With some notable exceptions, 
the sociology of emotions has been mainly concerned with how structures of various 
kinds, be them “cultural” (e.g. Hochschild 1979) or related to power and status (e.g. 
Kemper 1978), constrain, shape, structure, or determine situated emotions. Overall, the 
sociology of emotions has certainly contributed to demonstrate the relevance of looking 
at emotions with a sociological eye. But it has devoted little effort to conceptualizing 
emotions as a constitutive dimension of agency, alongside explicit and procedural 
knowledge, reasons to act and rule-following. This article makes the first steps toward a 
redefinition of the social agent as fundamentally emotional and, qua emotional, not only 
constrained by, but also productive of, social structure. 
The aim of the article is to indicate some of the ways in which situated emotions enter in 
the explanation of the production and reproduction of the social world. The general 
problem is that of what Anthony Giddens (1984) calls “structuration,” that is the problem 
of understanding how it comes about that situated actions, including their emotional 
variants, become stretched in space and time to form discernable institutions, “systems,” 
or “social practices.” Drawing on a critical reading of Giddens’ analysis of 
“routinization” I recognize a first emotional mechanism of structuration in the set of 
interactional techniques that Goffman (1967) placed under the heading of “face-work,” 
which in turn I interpret in the light of novel empirical work partly inspired in the 
affective sciences.  This mechanism mainly preserves social continuity, and to that extent 
                                                           
2 but see in France the publication in 1995 of the collective volume La couleur des pensées : sentiments, 
émotions, intentions [The color of thoughts: feelings, emotions, intentions]. (Paperman and Ogien 1995) 
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it plays a socially reproductive role. In order to delineate a mechanism whereby situated 
emotions may constribute to the creation of “structure,” and more precisely to the 
establishment of “sacred objects” or social norms, I critically reappropriate some 
elements of Randall Collins’ (2004) theory of interaction rituals. I then integrate these 
elements with traditional “structural” sociological theorizing on emotions and apply the 
resulting mechanism to the field of interethnic relations via Herbert Blumer’s (1958) 
concept of “sense of group position.” 
The thesis is that face-work and sacred-object establishment (for short, “enshrinement”) 
are emotional mechanisms of structuration. Face-work appears to be more concerned 
with continuity and reproduction, while enshrinement connotes novelty and change. The 
aim is less to exhaust the list of possible emotional mechanisms of structuration than to 
programmatically indicate that their study is theoretically cogent and empirically viable.  
 
Face-work as emotional mechanism of social reproduction 
 
Although it has rightly been the target of many criticisms (e.g. J. Turner 1986; Sewell Jr 
1992), I think that Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration remains a significant 
contribution even three decades after its publication. In this section I outline Giddens’ 
view of the task of social science and the related concept of structuration. This prepares 
the ground for the discussion on routinization and face-work that forms the content of the 
following sections. 
The argument is that emotionally accomplished face-work produces and reproduces 
social practices, systems or institutions stretching in space and time beyond the bounded 
encounters in which emotional face-work inescapably takes place. This is what is meant 
by saying that face-work is a mechanism of structuration. In order to argue that face-work 
is more precisely an emotional mechanism of structuration, I reinterpret Giddens’ view 
that routinization is essentially concerned with emotion regulation in the light of recent 
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In the course of social life, institutions present themselves to experience as those 
objective and constraining entities that Durkheim had in mind when delineating the 
“social” or “moral” fact. Giddens’ problem is to relate this experience of the social world 
as objective and constraining facticity to a conception of the social agent as actively 
producing and reproducing that social world. Inspired in various sources such as 
intepretive sociology, hermeneutics, Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, and Goffman’s 
studies of the interaction order, the view of the social agent as an active producer of their 
social world that emerged in the 1960s seriously put to task the conception of the agent 
on which sociological functionalism and structuralism, including its marxian variants, 
was and is based. Tu put it bluntly, this is the idea that “all men and women (…) are 
bloody silly.”  (Thompson 1968, 40) Giddens intended to synthesize these various 
developments emphasizing the active character of human agency with a more classical 
sociological concern with the experienced fixity of social institutions. The challenge is to 
articulate an account in which the constraining objectivity of institutions is achieved not 
in spite of, but rather thanks to, active human agency.  
Even though he discards the functionalist (and structuralist) picture of the human agent as 
an automaton, Giddens does not entirely jettison one of the central themes of functionalist 
sociology, namely the preoccupation with the unintended consequences of action as a 
principle of institutional (or “system”) reproduction. However, he proposes to renew the 
analysis of the socially reproductive effects of unintended consequences of action by 
freeing it from the sway of functionalist concepts. The premises beneath are that agency 
is the capacity to transform the environment, and that what the agent effectively 
transforms through their agency may not be entirely known to the agent. That the agent is 
not aware of all the consequences of their action, and particularly of those consequences 
related to the reproduction of social institutions, does not mean that the agent is moved by 
external or unconscious “forces.” It simply means that the understanding that the agent 
has of their action, at least in respect of its social reproductive implications, is bounded or 
incomplete. One important task of social science is therefore to demonstrate the intimate 
connection between situated actions and the larger spatial breath and temporal endurance 
of “objective” social institutions, especially in those cases in which agents do not clearly 
see the socially reproductive consequences of their situated actions. Giddens’ additional 
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remark, and one I wish to endorse, is that the understanding that agents hold of the 
consequences of their actions is not without effect for the continued reproduction of 
social institutions. Awareness of the socially reproductive consequences of their actions 
may lead agents to act differently in the future if they happen to deplore the institution 
whose reproduction they have unintendedly facilitated in the past. Social science may 
contribute to precipitate this cognitive and pragmatic shift3. 
This conception of the task of social science is incompatible with the confortable division 
of labor between “macro-” and “micro-sociology”. As Giddens points out, this manner of 
speaking of the relationship between institutions and situated actions is misleading 
insofar as it carries with it the connotation that macro- and micro-sociology, as “sub-
fields” of the discipline, are concerned with essentially distinct phenomena. But 
institutions do not exist independent of, or reproduce themselves in spite of, situated 
actions: they are those situated actions, to the extent that the latter can be seen as “the 
same” actions across space and time4. This becoming “stretched” of situated activities 
across wide spans of time-space defines what Giddens calls structuration.  
Conversely, the fleeting encounters that instantiate “the interaction order”, one of the 
central notions in what is usually called micro-sociology, cannot be rendered intelligible 
without reference to longer-lasting and more widespread institutions or “social practices.” 
Obvious examples are the rules of turn-taking and the face-saving techniques that confer 
situated gatherings their recognizable shape as social interactions. 
Stating that institutions and action are conceptually interdendent is not terribly 
informative, though. What I take to make Giddens’ originality in this respect is to 
formulate the problem of social order as concerned with the relationship between the 
integration of social interaction on the one hand, and the integration of larger “systems” 
or institutions on the other (but see Mouzelis 1989 for a criticism of this move). In order 
to do away with the dichotomy of the “macro” and the “micro”, Giddens reformulated 
Lockwood’s (1976) classical distinction between social and system integration. In this 
perspective, it is in the process of skillfully “doing” social interaction in a particular 
                                                           
3 Of course, the argument assumes all along the modern view that social institutions are not given by made 
by us, and the concomitant desideratum that we may transform social institutions if we judge them unfair. 
4 This is the very idea of “social practice” as it is usually understood in post-wittgensteinian social theory 
(S. Turner 1994). 
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setting (understood as a spacial and temporal locale) that institutions or “systems” 
spanning across a range of settings are produced and reproduced. In other words, it is as a 
consequence of the successful “integration” of social interaction that the “integration” of 
social institutions (i.e. structuration) takes place. When the socially reproductive effects 
of “integrated” face-to-face encounters are unknown to their participants, those effects 
can be considered as unintended consequences of action. Alternatively, agents may be 
aware of the socially reproductive effects of their actions and even attempt to “steer” the 
process reflexively.  
In this respect, Giddens invites to go beyond the usual confinement of micro-sociologists 
to the here-and-now situation, but also to avoid the usual blindness of macro-sociologists 
with regard to the inescapably situated enactment of “social structure” by active agents. 
Pace the tenants of functional analysis, the social agent is not an unreflective automaton 
moved by external or unconscious “forces.” But pace the proponents of micro-sociology, 
neither are the consequences of their actions necessarily bounded by the local setting of 
any particular social interaction episode. Active social agents, in the skillful production of 
local interaction, reflectively or unintendedly bring about consequences that produce and 
reproduce larger social institutions.  
I follow Giddens in the formulation of the general problem of “structuration”, but I am 
less inclined to think that he has provided any convincing solution. In general, he has 
been more preoccupied with mechanisms of social reproduction than with mechanisms of 
social change, which in practice reduces structuration to reproduction. The concept of 
“routinization” is a case in point that I will address in detail in the following section, 
given the connections it suggests between day-to-day activity, institutions, and emotions. 
In particular, I think that the slogan of the “duality of structure” has made 
disproportionate noise as compared to its theoretical fecundity. In Giddens’ glossary, 
“structure” does not refer to any actual institutions or social systems spanning across 
space and time but to “rules and resources” that have by definition only “virtual” 
existence, just in the way in which for Saussure langue is virtual as compared to the 
actuality of parole. So defined, “structure” is dual because it is at once medium and 
outcome of situated action. But as Sewell (1992) observes, Giddens’ notion of “structure” 
as “rules and resources” is inconsistent, because even though “rules” (generalizable 
Aranguren, Martin. 2015. “Emotional mechanisms of social (re)production.” Social Science Information. 
 8 
procedures) can be easily thought of as “outside of space and time”, no sense can be 
made of “resources” without reference to human bodies and physical objects, which by 
definition occupy space and endure through time. This flaw undermines the “theorem” of 
the duality of structure of which the notion of structure is a building block. It is important 
to note that the “theorem” of the “duality of structure” is conceptually independent from 
the formulation of the general problem of structuration. The shortcomings of the former 
do not immediately invalidate the latter. 
The problem is then accounting for the fact that the active production of interaction in 
spatio-temporally bounded settings has as a consequence the production and reproduction 
of longer-lasting and more widespread institutions, “practices”, or “social systems”. This 




The notion of “routinization” points to processes of social reproduction actively sustained 
by agents through their repetitive day-to-day activities. Routinization binds institutions, 
everyday activity, and the psychological needs of the human agent. The notion is relevant 
in the present context because it explicitly accords an active role to emotions in social 
reproduction. 
Drawing on Erikson’s (1962) theory of personality development, the thesis is that 
“ontological security”, or “trust” or confidence in the continuity of the world, is a basic 
psychological need that agents can only satisfy through routine day-to-day activity. In a 
sense, routinization is a cunning of institutional reason: agents seek ontological security 
through habitual conduct, and in their striving they bring about social reproduction, with 
higher or lower awareness of the socially reproductive consequences of their habitual 
conduct.  
Giddens states that habitual action is indirectly motivated by the need to sustain security 
and, concomitantly, to avoid the emotion of anxiety. This generalized motive is further 
assumed to be unconscious in the freudian sense that the agent is not able to put it into 
words. The need for ontological security thus defines the “deep” motivational component 
of Giddens’ “stratification model” of individual personality, avowedly inspired in Freud’s 
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classical id, ego and super-ego triad. In this model, the middle “stratum” is occupied by 
practical consciousness, which operates in circumstances in which people pay attention to 
events going on around them so as to relate their conduct to those events. On top of the 
stratification model lies discursive consciousness, which designates the agents’ ability to 
provide linguistically articulated reasons for their actions. Whereas the need for 
ontological security defines the general unconscious motive of the agent, practical and 
discursive consciousness point to he bases of their “knowledgeable” or “reflexive 
monitoring” of action. The unconscious pushes blindly, and consciousness steers lucidly 
and skillfully.  
Giddens sees in Goffman’s (1967) “face-work” (which he renames “tact”) an important 
mechanism for the maintenance of ontological security, and interprets Garkinkel’s (1967) 
“experiments with trust” as the demonstration that breaches of routine bring to the 
surface of consciousness that deep uncounscious anxiety which agents actively seek to 
curb through day-to-day activity. He observes that another context for examining the 
ontological security-providing function of routine is the counterfactual study of “critical 
situations”, e.g. the personality changes that Nazi concentration camp prisoners undergo 
as a result of the drastic disruption of their accustumed ways of conduct. 
There can be no quarreling with the idea that the integration of personality and the 
perpetuation of day-to-day activity are interdependent, but I feel less persuaded by 
Giddens’ assimilation of the distinction between (pushing) motive and (steering) 
knowledgeability on the one hand, to the distinction between the unconscious and the 
conscious on the other. Why assume that motive is unconscious? Colin Campbell (1996) 
recalls two traditional meanings of motive, the one referring to that which “motivates”, 
“causes,” or “moves” an action, and the other to the actor’s reasons for acting, i.e. their 
end-in-view. However, in the history of sociology the final or end-in-view acception has 
obliterated the causal or dynamic understanding of motive. Campbell sees this state of 
affairs as resulting from a mistaken alignment of the dynamic meaning of motive with 
behaviorism, as though embracing the familiar idea that motives push to action amounted 
to disavowing the project of interpretive sociology with its stress on meaning and 
voluntarism.  
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Giddens seems to build on these assumptions when he states that while day-to-day 
conduct is “reflexively monitored,” it is “not directly motivated.” He does not entirely do 
away with the causal meaning of motive but neither does he integrate it with the 
“knowledgeable” side of the human agent. In positing that the avoidance of ontological 
anxiety is an unconscious motive, he preserves all the advantages of a causal explanation 
of habitual action without questioning the widespread but mistaken view that the causal 
acception of motive is irrelevant, if not radically inimical, to the project of interpretive 
sociology.  
The prize of this move is high, however. For the explanation of habitual action as relying 
on unconscious motivation surreptitiously brings Giddens back to the picture of the 
human agent that he wished to discard in the first place. In lieu of the automaton of 
functionalist and structuralist sociology, moved by outer social forces, we find the 
automaton of psychoanalysis, moved by inner unconscious motives. Explaining action, a 
fortiori routine, as a result of unconscious motivation does no good to the construction of 
an account of enduring and widespread institutions in terms of situated active agency.  
But the unconscious motive that Giddens has is mind is also wanting from an empirical 
point of view. His attempt to squeeze the results of Garfinkel’s breaching experiments 
into the stratification model of the agent is not particularly convincing. First, one may 
wonder in what sense, as examples of what is involved in loss of ontological security, 
Garfinkel’s isolated and after all innocuous disruptions of everyday scenes are 
comparable to the systematic and devastating effects of concentration camp life. But even 
if one overlooks this dubious parallel, it is hard to see how the manifold emotional 
reactions that Garkinfel reported can be plausibly reduced to the expression of 
undifferentiated anxiety. For example, Garfinkel notes that “reports were filled with 
accounts of astonishment, bewilderment, shock, anxiety, embarrassment, and anger”. 
(Garfinkel 1963, 232) Everybody knows from common experience that the understanding 
of the situation and the motivation to act characteristic of astonishment and anger, to take 
only these examples, are largely different. What theoretical progress do we make by 
dilluting their specificity in an undifferentiated category of diffuse anxiety5? 
                                                           
5 This is not to deny, of course, that the word “anxiety” may adequately describe a family 
of emotional states related to a negative assessment of perceived incertainty or ambiguity, 
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That unconscious motives bring us back to a passive picture of the agent, and that anxiety 
is inadequate to the description of breaches of routine does not mean, however, that 
motives cannot be invoked to explain action, and that emotions are inadequate to account 
for social control. It rather means that we need neither to assume that motives are 
unconscious, nor that anxiety is the be-all of emotion.  
In fact, drawing on phenomenology and appraisal theory (Frijda 1986), emotions can be 
conceived of as motivational states of which the agent is always aware, in the sense that 
there is something “it is like” to be in an emotional state (Lambie and Marcel 2002). In 
Giddens’ terms, emotional experience always presents itself in practical consciousness. 
The agent may have second-order awareness of the first-order experience of the emotion 
state, and thus the agent may be able to report on the phenomenology of (what it is like to 
be in) that emotion state. In Giddens’ schema, this means that in some cases the 
experience of emotion may be accessible to discursive consciousness. Since the 
experience of emotion involves among its components the experience of a motivational 
state, it follows that emotional motives are always experienced in practical consciousness 
and sometimes available in discursive consciousness. Emotional motives need not be 
lodged in any inaccessible unconscious realm. They are better conceived of as states of 
the whole organism that carry with them the subjective experience of an urge to act and 
get outwardly expressed in visible bodily changes. 
Again drawing on phenomenology and appraisal theory, in lieu of the indifferentiation of 
context-blind anxiety, the differentiation of emotions can be thought of in terms of the 
characteristic understanding of the situation that they imply or the kind of action that they 
solicit. In Frijda’s (1986) theory, for example, that understanding always entails an 
evaluation of the situation or object of emotion, and that action appears as moved by an 
“action tendency” which is also describable by the end result it aims6. Seeing the object 
                                                           
and manifest in extreme cases in sleepless nights and various forms of discomfort. But 
this emotion is neither diffuse nor indifferentiated, and far from being unconscious in the 
freudian sense there is always something “it is like” to be anxious (in other words, 
anxiety has a distinct phenomenology). I thank one anonymous reviewer for his or her 
remark on this point.  
6 Frijda’s notion of action tendency thus embraces the two meanings of “motive” invoked above, namely 
the final/end-in-view and causal/dynamic acceptions. He also uses the more general notion of “action 
readiness change”, which differs from action tendency in that it does not involve a definite end-in-view 
alongside a general preparation to act. 
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as an intolerable obstacle and experiencing (and bodily expressing) the urge to vigorously 
remove it is a way of beginning an analysis of some of the episodes that we usually 
consider to be instances of anger. Emotions differentiated by appraisal and action 
tendency need not be conflated under a general category of anxiety. 
As much as phenomenology and appraisal theory provide a way to integrate 
differentiated emotions in practical and discursive consciousness, Garfinkel (1963) points 
to an alternative analysis of the need for ontological security. Giddens is probably right in 
positing that the integration of personality depends on experiencing the continuity of the 
world, which involves the active sustaining of that continuity through habitual conduct. 
But I do not think that we need to go very far to understand why people are motivated to 
produce the continuity of the world. In this respect, Garfinkel stresses the significance of 
analyzing “social affects” in terms of “background expectancies,” observing that people 
portray themselves as concerned with how to conduct their daily affairs “so as to solicit 
enthusiasm and friendliness or avoid anxiety, guilt, shame, or boredom.” (Garfinkel 1963, 
233) Background expectancies are basic, mostly implicit anticipations as to how the 
world is to continue. Conforming to them preserves calmness or brings about positive 
emotions, while breaching them triggers negative emotions. We only need to understand 
that human agents prefer the ease of calmness and the euforia of positive emotions to the 
pangs of negative emotions7 to understand why they conform to background 
expectancies, thereby sustaining the continuity of the world through habitual action. 
There is no need to conceptualize the search for ontological security in terms of an 
unconscious motive to avoid diffuse anxiety.  
 
The role of emotions in face-work 
 
To recap, even though I endorse Giddens’ formulation of the problem of structuration as 
that of the stretching of “the same” situated actions across space and time, for the reasons 
presented above I think that his concept of routization is unconvincing. I have pointed at 
some ways in which this concept could be amended so as to make it compatible with a 
conception of the active human agent.  
                                                           
7 Jon Elster (1999) has offered a similar explanation of why people conform to social norms. His thesis is 
that people conform in order to avoid the painful experience of shame. 
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I do think, however, that Giddens has identified a set of mechanisms whereby the routine 
character of day-to-day situated activity is sustained, namely the interactional techniques 
for expressing considerateness and maintaining self-respect that Goffman (1967) places 
under the heading of “face-work.”  
Keeping the above qualifications in mind, I also think that Giddens is right to complain 
that a significant drawback of Goffman’s work is the studied absence of an account of 
motivation, especially because it has fostered the naive dramaturgical reading that 
participants to interaction are distanced actors deliberately playing scripts for the cynical 
manipulation of appearances. However, as we have seen, Giddens’ postulation of an 
unconscious motive to avoid anxiety is not of much help in this respect. An additional 
shortcoming of Giddens’ solution, not mentioned in the previous discussion, is that the 
alignment of emotion with anxiety, and of anxiety with the unconscious carries with it the 
misleading connotation that the occurrence of emotion reveals not the normal functioning 
but the breakdown of face-work or “interaction ritual.” In this section I would like to 
provide some empirical support to the thesis that some specific emotions are essentially 
constitutive of face-work. Goffman (1967) did not entirely neglect the emotional 
dimension of face-to-face interaction, as his chapter on embarrassment and his sporadic 
use of the vocabulary of affect demonstrates. But neither did he attempt to systematically 
integrate emotions into his analysis of interaction. 
Drawing on Goffman’s sequential description of “corrective interchanges,” Aranguren 
and Tonnelat (2014) in Paris, and later on Aranguren (forthcoming 2016) in Delhi, 
investigated how passengers of crowded metro trains accomplish face-work in the face of 
unavoidable “territorial” incursions due to unwanted physical contact during rush hours. 
These studies found that in such circumstances face-work is mostly enacted through 
nonverbal signals that the psychological literature interprets as expressions of emotions. 
In treating nonverbal expressions of emotions as interactional “moves,” this research 
questions the implicit equation often made between interactional move and turn at talk. 
On the other hand, it considers expressions of emotions, usually treated formally and in 
isolation, from the point of view of their function in the larger context of interaction 
sequences. 
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In the Delhi and Paris metros corrective interchanges often involve the following 
sequence of moves between the toucher (the offender) and the touched (the victim). First, 
the offender touches the victim, which in most cases involves mutual contact on the 
surface of the shoulders or the upper back. Second, the touched simultaneously raises and 
lowers the brow, thereby displaying the upper face components of the facial 
configuration that participants to recognition tests agree to associate to the word “fear” 
(Ekman and Friesen 1975). There are no good reasons, however, to think that the touched 
experiences fear; in fact, the content analysis that Aranguren and Tonnelat (2014) present 
at the outset of their study rather suggests that passengers experience annoyance at being 
touched by a stranger8. Third, with the “fear” upper face on display, the touched turns 
their head and eyes toward the toucher.  
In the complete repair sequence, the toucher then performs the fourth and last move by 
displaying some or all of the components of the facial configuration that participants to 
recognition studies agree to associate to the word “embarrassment” (Keltner 1995). The 
expression typically involves lowcast gaze, chin raising, and lips pressing. After this 
move on the part of the toucher, the touched returns their head and eyes to the initial 
position and the upper face components of the “fear” face disappear from their forehead. 
These changes are taken to mark the successful termination of the repair sequence.  
However, the sequence may unfold in a different manner with radically contrasting 
effects. The third move, namely the victim’s turning of the head and eyes toward the 
offender, may not be followed by the offender’s display of “embarrassment.” If, in 
addition to this, the offender subsequently repeats the annoying touch, the victim may 
                                                           
8 Some readers might find puzzling that a pattern characterized as the “fear” face could be actually 
expressing annoyance. This becomes less puzzling when one recalls the highly disputable basis for 
associating this expressive pattern to the word “fear” in recognition studies. Participants in this 
experimental task are presented with a sequence of static frontal pictures of facial expressions and 
requested to choose from a closed list of emotion terms the word that best characterizes each observed 
expression. Participants may agree to a greater or lesser extent on the emotion word that they choose to 
characterize any given observed expression. Claims about the universal expression of “basic” emotions are 
based on nearly 70% agreement rates. This procedure has been the target of acute methodological criticism 
(Russel 1994). An alternative approach to recognition studies, the study of components, seeks to associate 
expressions of emotions not to generic words chosen by distant observers but to the specific stimulus 
situations to which such expressions immediately respond. A host of field and laboratory studies have 
shown that the expressions actually displayed by people in response to specific emotional situations are 
sometimes markedly inconsistent with the results of recognition studies. See for example Fernández-Dols 
et al. (this publication). For a review of experimental components studies, see Aranguren and Tonnelat 
(2014), and for a review of field components studies, see Fernández-Dols and Crivelli (2013). 
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terminate the sequence not with a direct return to neutral but with a prior expression that 
participants to recognition studies associate to the word “contempt” involving the inward 
tightening of the lip corners. (Ekman and Friesen 1986; Izard and Haynes 1988)  
From a functional perspective, the expressions are not primarily outward presentations of 
inward feelings, but actions transforming the environment9 that together form a unitary 
emotional transaction. The victim’s “fear” upper face is a request or demand, and its 
function is to coerce an apology from the offender. Similarly, the offender’s 
“embarrassment” expression functions to give ritual satisfaction to the victim’s demand. 
When this appeasing reply is not forthcoming, and the offender happens to repeat the 
touch, the victim’s “contempt” expression effects symbolic exclusion or “degradation” 
(Garfinkel 1956) of the offender, assuming with Fischer and Roseman (2007) that the 
function of contempt is to exclude its target from the social world of the agent. 
Thus, in the interaction sequences reported in these studies the expressions of “fear,” 
“embarrassment,” and “contempt,” and their concomitant functions of coercion, 
appeasement and exclusion are indissociably intertwined with the workings of the repair 
sequence. Emotions are present not only when the repair sequence breaks down, as it is 
the case when repeat offense prompts the “contempt” expression, but also when remedial 
work is effective, as it is the case when the the victim’s “fear” face successfully coerces 
the  appeasing “embarrasment” expression of the offender.  
These interactional episodes are not unrelated to the production and reproduction of 
specific sets of social pratices or institutions. At the more proximal level, emotionally 
accomplished face-work contributes to the social organization of the metro ride, and 
therefore to the reproduction of the metro network as a complex technical and social 
system of mass transportation. At the most distal level, but at the same time entering into 
the local organization of the metro ride itself, successful face-work reproduces the 
institution of individualism, that “cult” of the person that Durkheim deemed to be 
characteristic of modern society and that motivated Goffman to associate face-to-face 
interaction to ritual activity.  
                                                           
9 This is why John Dewey (1894), complaining that William James’ theory of emotion had not entirely quit 
the terrain of Darwin’s, proposed to drop the term “expression” and adopt in its stead the term “attitude.” I 
would employ “attitude” to stress the functional dimension of “expressions of emotions” if the term had not 
acquired the contemporary connotation of latent disposition – that is, just the opposite of the patent, 
occurrent act that Dewey had in mind. 
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It is important to note that even though face-work in general can be assumed to be a 
universal social mechanism, its form and function may present important variations 
across cultures and epochs, which in turn are related to the production and reproduction 
of specific social institutions. For example, as regards function it is unlikely that face-
work will serve the same purposes in a society that dramatizes hierarchy as compared to a 
society which, like ours, dramatizes equality. In other words, face-work reproduces the 
status of interaction partners, and the expected status to be confirmed depends on the 
institutional background of the larger society or specific setting in which the encounter 
takes place.  
 
Enshrinement as emotional mechanism of norm fixation 
 
Face-work, understood as a vehicle of routine, exemplifies an emotional mechanism of 
structuration in the sense of social reproduction. The aim of repair, for exemple, is to 
restore a disrupted relationship, not to create a new one. Face-work is mainly about 
“saving” face (or status), and day-to-day routine, as produced through face-saving 
techniques, is therefore inherently conservative. But if structuration boiled down to social 
reproduction, we would be better adviced to stay by the latter, more usual term. In 
actuality structuration also involves novel patterning, that is the formation of new 
institutional arrangements. But Giddens does not provide any hint as to how to 
conceptualize the role of situated emotions in the production of novel patterning. This is 
why in order to examine how situated emotions may give rise to longer-lasting and more 
widespread arrangements I will leave aside the theory of structuration and engage with 
Randall Collins’ (2004) theory of the interaction ritual. 
To anticipate, I argue that face-to-face interaction episodes characterized by emotions 
may contribute to the establishment of emotional obligations with the power to constrain 
future encounters. I pick up from Collins the durkheimian idea that emotional obligations 
get stored in and are subsequently recalled by “sacred objects.” Blumer’s analysis of the 
“sense of group position” provides an apt middle-range translation of these abstract 
concepts as they might be applied to the particular field of interethnic relations. Local 
interactions in which participants ascribe one another to specific ethnic groups (e.g. We: 
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the French; They: the Roma from Eastern Europe) may give rise to intense emotions (e.g. 
fear of the individuals categorized as Roma). If these emotions are objectified or 
verbalized, they may by virtue of a process of dissemination (e.g. through the media) 
contribute to fix a dominant characterization of the ethnic groups involved (e.g. We, the 
French, are threatened by the Roma; They, the Roma, are dangerous). Insofar as these 
characterizations enter in the organization of experience as anticipatory schemas, in 
future encounters the members of the other ethnic group appear as “sacred objects” that 
recall emotional obligations. I propose to use the word “enshrinement” to summarize this 
complex process. 
In what follows I first critically review interaction ritual theory, then discuss the notion of 
emotion rules, and finally introduce the concept of “sense of group position” before 
providing an outline of enshrinement as emotional mechanism of social (re)production. 
 
Interaction ritual theory 
 
An important achievement of Collins’ theory is to have reinfused Goffman’s analysis of 
face-work as “interaction ritual” with the emotions that Durkheim deemed characteristic 
of religious practice. Collins posits that interaction ritual is the mechanism of production 
and reproduction of society. Interaction rituals are bounded by particular situations, but 
their outcomes may “spill over” in time and space, thereby placing conditions upon the 
initial ingredients of future and distant interaction rituals. The concept that connects the 
outcomes of the here-and-now interaction ritual with the starting ingredients of future and 
distant interaction rituals is called “emotional energy.”  
The model of the interaction ritual thus distinguishes between ingredients and outcomes. 
The ingredients are physical copresence of two or more individuals, boundaries between 
insiders and outsiders, a common focus of attention, and shared (or collective) emotion. 
Collins contention is that when the common focus of attention and the shared emotion 
reinforce each other through “rythmic entrainment” the interaction ritual brings about 
solidarity (i.e. feelings of membership), changes in the level of emotional energy, group 
symbols or “sacred objects”, and feelings of morality.  
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In order to identify a possible emotional mechanism of structuration as institutional 
creation, I will retain Collins’ hypothesis that one outcome of interaction ritual may be 
the establishment of “sacred objects.” However, in this respect the theory lacks the 
empirical detail that would make it immediately applicable. This is why discussion on 
sacred-object establishement, or “enshrinement” for short, will be deferred until a later 
section concerned with Herbert Blumer’s (1958) middle-range theory of the “sense of 
group position.” On the other hand, no sensible use of Collins’ theory can be made 
without previous acknowledgement of its limitations. These are made explicit in the rest 
of the present section. 
The most glaring shortcoming concerns the method of theory-building itself. Collins 
claims to bring forward testable hypotheses but all his materials are second-hand and 
produced for purposes very different from the ones he has in mind. As a result, the 
relationship between the ingredients and the outcomes in the interaction ritual model 
largely remain hypothetical constructs, as much as the notion of emotional energy.  
Additionally, Collins asserts that the relationship between rythmic entrainment and 
solidarity is of a causal nature, but it seems to me that all he demonstrates at best is that 
rythmic entrainment expresses solidarity. This is particularly apparent in his discussion of 
conversational turn-taking rules. He contends that conversations that follow the “no gap 
no overlap” pattern are the cause of solidarity. This argument would make sense if it were 
possible to separate the cause, the smooth rythmic coordination of turns, from the effect, 
the feelings of solidarity between the conversationalists, and then examine if the 
occurrence of the cause is followed by the occurrence of the effect. What Collins does, 
however, is indicate that synchronization expresses or manifests solidarity, just as a facial 
expression expresses or manifests an emotion. Conversely, lack of synchronization 
expresses lack of solidarity, so that “in angry arguments (…) both participants try to talk 
at the same time, typically speaking louder and faster in an effort to override the other.” 
(Collins 2004, 70) Not that speaking louder and faster is the cause and lack of solidarity 
the effect: speaking louder and faster is simply a way of expressing lack of solidarity or 
hostility. It would be awkward to me to be told by a sociologist that my deliberate 
interruption of a person’s turn at talk was not an expression but the cause of my hostility 
toward that person. Since the demonstrated link is expressive and not causal, the 
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inescapable conclusion is that the vocabulary of mechanism is inadequate to the 
relationship between rythmic entrainment and feelings of solidarity. More generally, as 
von Scheve (2011) points out, Collins offers only sparse hints as to how exactly shared or 
collective emotions are elicited and transmitted. 
This is not to say that interaction rituals cannot in principle be shown to produce 
solidarity or, more precisely, to reconfigure the status of interpersonal relations 
(Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2004). But rythmic entrainment alone does not seem 
to be the process responsible of this end result. Take the example of the repair sequence 
discussed above. The end result is to restore the relationship between the participants that 
was altered or disrupted by the offensive event. A specific mechanism does this job, 
namely the sequence of interactional moves that Goffman (1967) calls “corrective 
interchange.” Goffman occasionally compares the “interchange” to a dance. I agree with 
Collins that rhythm is important, but nobody would suggest that a dance is only made of 
rhythm. The other essential component are the steps or, in goffmanian jargon, the 
“moves.”  
Now, looking at the moves of the repair sequence as instantiated in expressions of 
emotions leads to question a further component of Collins’ model, namely the 
assumption that for interaction rituals to produce their outcomes the emotion generated 
must be common to the copresent individuals. The corrective interchange, when sufficient 
attention is accorded to its emotionally expressive components, is made of different 
emotions and not of only one. What is more, these different emotions are also 
complementary, as it is apparent in the relationship between the victim’s annoyance, 
which functions to coerce an apology, and the offender’s embarrassment, which acts to 
appease the victim. Of course, acknowledging that the emotions involved in interaction 
rituals may be complementary and not only common does not fundamentally invalidate 
Collins’ and Durkheim’s thesis that interaction rituals produce emotions. In durkheimian 
terminology, it only adds an “organic” variety of ritual emotion to the “mechanic” variety 
of the original model10. 
                                                           
10 Cf. von Scheve and Ismer (2013) for an up-to-date integrative account of collective (or “mechanic”) 
emotions combining interaction ritual theory with contemporary psychological research in affective 
science. 
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The last critical comment I would like to make of Collins’ model prepares the ground for 
the next section and concerns the process hypothesized to establish new “sacred objects.” 
Collins thus summarizes the mechanism of sacred-object establishment: “There is the raw 
experience (…). Next comes the transformation of these experiences into symbols (…). 
Yet more temporally remote, and more remote, too, in the kinds of social networks 
involved, is a second order of circulation of newly created symbols among persons who 
are far away from the initial experiences.” (Collins 2004, 95) In other words, first comes 
the situated emotions that arise in face-to-face interactions, second the symbolization of 
these situated emotions, and third a process of circulation, remote in time and space, of 
the disembodied symbols that stand for these situated emotions. 
Interaction ritual theory contends that emotions emerge from the coordinated behaviors 
of copresent individuals and that these emotions (or the solidarity that they are supposed 
to bring about) may become symbolized or “stored” in the objects that were the common 
focus of attention at the time of intense emotion. In Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) 
terms, the contention is that “objectified” emotions become “detached” from the local 
circumstances of their emergence. However, interation ritual theory adds little to the 
understanding of how emotionally charged objects become disembodied symbols that 
circulate in space-time sectors remote from the original situation of their emergence, with 
the eventual effect that such objects acquire the power to command the awe (e.g. the 
UNICEF logo) or the abhorrence (e.g. the Nazi Swastika) of large audiences. Not much is 
said about the latter effect either, and this is all the more unfortunate that the power of 
symbols to compel respect or rejection, rooted in situated emotions but stretching its 
influence across time and space, reconciliates interaction ritual theory with more 
traditional “structural” approaches in the sociology of emotions. Indeed symbols can be 
thought of as carriers of emotion rules, as I propose to rephrase Hochschild’s (1979) 
“feeling rules.” Otherwise put, as a result of interaction rituals and the subsequent process 




Hochschild (1979) coined the phrase “feeling rules” to refer to sanctioned pairings of 
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types of emotions and types of situations. For example, the participants to a mariage must 
be happy; the participants to a funeral must be sad. “Feeling rules” are also hypothesized 
to govern the intensity and duration of situated emotions: a slighted person can be “too” 
angry or “for too long”. “Feeling rules” determine situated emotions through “emotion 
work”, i.e. the activity of aligning actual with expected emotion, especially in those cases 
in which actual emotions are utterly inappropriate (e.g. being amused in a funeral).  
Hochshild’s “feeling rules” that compel “emotion work” provide a useful account of how 
social structure determines or constrains situated emotions. But the terminological 
asymetry between rules that regulate “feelings” and a work that concerns “emotion” is 
not unimportant. It actually reflects Hochshild’s internalist conception of emotion work, 
and of emotion processes more generally (see Aranguren 2014 for a review). The activity 
of conforming emotion to social norms operates on inner feelings (“deep acting”), and 
not on the outer behaviors that were at the center of Mauss’ (1968) classical analysis of 
the obligatory expression of emotions. However, contemporary theories of emotions no 
longer separate “feeling”, i.e. the content of emotional experience, from other 
components of emotion such as expressive behavior11 (Lambie and Marcel 2002). I 
therefore retain Hochshild’s emphasis on the normative constraints that regulate emotions 
but I suggest to drop the restrictive focus on inner feeling. This is why I prefer the phrase 
“emotion rules” to the original “feeling rules”.  
In sum, the process of sacred-object creation begins with situated emotions and ends with 
the establishement of emotion rules carried by definite symbols. In between, situated 
emotions are symbolized, and the resulting symbols enter a process of circulation. The 
challenge is to spell out the connections between the processes of situated emotion, 
                                                           
11 It might be objected that this theory of emotions is unable to integrate the familiar fact that we sometimes 
successfully mask our emotions. For example, a guest in a cocktail party might smile and give the 
impression of being engrossed in the situation while being deeply (in the double sense of intensely and 
innerly) bored. I do not think that this places a serious objection on the theory that emotions are total 
organic states and not just inner feelings. It rather suggests that the masking of emotions is an interactional 
achievement that depends not only on the author but also on the recipient of the masking. In general, an 
analysis of deception is incomplete if it stays by the deceiver; we also need to understand how it comes 
about that the deceived falls into the trap. Some people are more proficient than others at deception 
production and recognition (Knapp et al 2014). In most successful episodes of emotion masking in 
everyday life we do a quite imperfect production job that comes off only because the recipient does still a 
more imperfect job of recognition. Such a circumstance is in my view insufficient to dismiss the theory that 
emotions are states of the whole organism that are always expressed, however subtle this expression turns 
out to be. 
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emotion symbolization, symbol circulation, and symbol enshrinement, a sequence which 
I take to embody an emotional mechanism of structuration. Herbert Blumer’s (1958) 
concept of “sense of group position” provides an illuminating avenue in this respect. 
 
The sense of group position: emotion rules in interethnic relations 
 
In the domain of interethnic relations, an apt concept to stand for emotion rules is 
Blumer’s (1958) “sense of group position”. With this notion Blumer intends to 
sociologize the psychological concept of race prejudice as it applied to “race relations” 
between Blacks and Whites in the United States. Without denying the emotional 
character of race prejudice, Blumer contends that the feelings of antipathy, hostility, 
hatred, intolerance, and aggressiveness that enter into the traditional definition of 
prejudice are not the outcome of individual inclination but of a social process.  
For Blumer, “[a] basic understanding of race prejudice must be sought in the process by 
which racial groups form images of themselves and of others.” (ibid, p. 3) In this 
collective process of characterization “definitions are presented and feelings are 
expressed” (ibid, p. 5). The outcome of the process is a socially sanctioned “sense of 
group position” which governs the emotions that members of one racial group ought to 
have with regard to members of the other racial group. For example, in post-slavery race 
relations, the sense of group position implies the following components from the 
standpoint of Whites: 1) a feeling of White superiority, 2) a feeling that Blacks are 
intrinsically different and alien, 3) a feeling of White legitimate claim to certain areas of 
privilege and advantage, and 4) a fear and suspicion that Blacks threaten these privileges 
and advantages. 
The sense of group position can be seen as a complex of socially enforced emotion rules. 
Conversely, these emotion rules come into being through a collective process of 
characterization in which situated emotions play an important role. “The happening that 
seems momentous, that touches deep sentiments, that seems to raise fundamental 
questions about relations, and that awakens strong feelings of identification with one’s 
racial group is the kind of event that is central in the formation of the racial image.” (ibid, 
p. 6) The definition process starts with the narrativization of situated emotions and 
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involves the circulation of narratives through various media such as stories, gossip, 
anecdotes, or pronouncements. These sediment in a stable characterization of one’s and 
the other ethnic group when the interaction becomes circular and reinforcing. An 
additional aspect that Blumer highlights is the abstract and categorical quality of the 
characterization thus formed. Indeed, it is the very nature of the resulting stereotypes to 
make individuals into symbols of their social category who must therefore be treated not 
as singular persons but as undifferentiated embodiments of that category. The members 
of venerated or stigmatized social categories thus becomes “sacred objects” that 
command respect or rejection, awe or abhorrence, compassion or disgust.  
Bringing together Collins’ interaction ritual theory, Hochschild’s emphasis on the 
structural determination of emotion, and Blumer’s concept of the sense of group position, 
the following emotional mechanism of structuration appears to be relevant to the study of 
interethnic relations. Encounters between two or more individuals ascribing one another 
to different ethnic groups give rise to situated emotions. Within or after the encounter, 
such emotions are represented or symbolized in various media12. This involves among 
others the evaluative characterization of the relevant ethnic groups, and the corresponding 
emotional attitudes that one is expected to hold toward members of the groups so 
characterized. For example, a group characterized as offensive is the appropriate target of 
anger; a group held as superior, of awe; a group depicted as polluting, of disgust; a group 
seen as a victim, of compassion. These evaluative characterizations, including the 
emotional rules they imply, then become disembodied symbols that enter a process of 
interaction with other comparable disembodied characterizations. All these symbols are 
candidate sacred objects, but only those that reinforce each other to the extent of 
marginalizing competing depictions become enshrined, that is pervasive, recurrent, self-
evident, or taken for granted. Since the enshrined caracterizations involve emotional 
obligations toward the members of such and such ethnic group, at the end of the process 
they arise as the embodiment of definite emotion rules that constrain by anticipation 
future and distant encounters with the members of those groups. For example, if the 
characterization of the Roma that becomes self-evident depicts this group as dangerous 
                                                           
12 Jocelyne Arquembourg (this publication) provides a powerful perspective for analyzing the process of 
emotion categorization. 
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(vs. vulnerable), fear (vs. compassion) becomes the obligatory emotion that the non 
Roma are expected and expect to experience in encounters with the Roma. In this 
example, the individuals ascribed to the Roma category become symbols of mandatory 
emotions. This is why in interethnic contacts their presence commands fear, that is the 
tendency to avoid. 
 
Note on the concept of mechanism 
 
I have deferred this epistemological note on the concept of mechanism for two reasons. 
First, matters of epistemology logically depend on matters of ontology. Without a clear of 
understanding of what we are talking about, it makes little sense to try to stipulate the 
standards of appropriate knowledge of that “what.” The second reason is strictly 
rhetorical. Many readers who might find appropriate to regard Goffman’s “interchanges” 
as instances of social mechanisms might also be hostile toward an explicit formulation of 
the concept of mechanism, presumably because the latter involves causal assumptions, 
and causal assumptions are bound to be very bad for sociology based on an active picture 
of the agent. But whoever accepts that action is the capacity to transform the environment 
or the ability to “make a difference” has already endorsed causal assumptions about 
action, and a fortiori about the sociological significance of action.  
The concept of mechanism on which I have relied throughout is one among others 
accepted within “analytical sociology”: “a constellation of entities and activities that are 
linked to one another is such a way that they regularly bring about a particular type of 
outcome.” (Hedström 2005, 11) Mechanisms are explanatory devices. They can be 
profitably used to explain how the active agent, through their situated actions, produces 
and reproduces institutions, “systems,” or “social practices.” The “entity” is the active 
agent, the “activity” is situated action, and the outcome is institutional, system, or 
practice production and reproduction (that is, structuration). In the particular case of the 
repair sequence, the entities are the victim and the offender, the activity the successive 
“moves,” and the outcome the restoration of the disrupted relationship, that is 
maintenance of continuity in the social world. The mechanism of sacred-object creation 
in interethnic relations is a compound of two mechanisms. In the first place, the members 
Aranguren, Martin. 2015. “Emotional mechanisms of social (re)production.” Social Science Information. 
 25 
of mutually ascribed ethnic groups are the entities, their situated emotions the activities, 
and symbolization (narrativization) of these emotions the outcome13. In the second place, 
the media may be the entities, dissemination of the resulting characterizations the 
activity, and prevalence of one particular characterization (with its corresponding 
obligatory emotions) the outcome, that is “enshrinement” or establishment of emotion 
rules. 
Although I am using analytical sociology’s definition of mechanism as a way of defining 
what counts as a good explanation, I do not wish to endorse analytical sociology’s 
additional claim that the be-all of sociology is mechanism-based explanation. Descriptive 
work in sociology is significant on its own, and there is no good reason to think that the 
only valid scientific aim is explanation.  
Finally, while I follow the analytical sociologists in their understanding of action as a 
causally efficient event, I do not embrace their davidsonian view of action as behavior 
that “is explainable (…) by desires, beliefs and opportunities.” (Hedström 2005, 38) I 
agree with Giddens that this approach confuses action, the capacity to transform the 




Within sociology, the picture of the active human agent promoted by hermeneutics, 
ethnomethodology, and studies on the interaction order since the 1960s has been 
besieging the functionalist and structuralist assumption of the “bloody silly” automaton. 
But the battle has been fought mainly on the front of cognition, under various headings 
such as discursive and practical consciousness, reasons to act, procedural knowledge, and 
rule-following. The part played by emotions in this renewed picture of the human agent 
has not received any comparable amount of attention.  
                                                           
13 Nothing prevents this first part of the overall mechanism from beginning with face-
work episodes, especially when the latter glaringly fail. Failed face-work may motivate 
activities of accusation and counter-accusation effecting in situ symbolization of the 
emotional interaction, which may provide the raw materials for the subsequent phases of 
detached circulation and normative enshrinement. I thank one anonymous reviewer for 
drawing attention to this interesting possibility. 
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On the other hand, the sociology of emotion has established the legimacy of the 
sociological study of affective phenomena, but the focus has been much more on the 
social or “structural” determination of emotions than on the active role of emotions in the 
establishment of novel social patterning or “structure.” In this article I have attempted to 
outline two mechanisms, viz. face-work and enshrinement, whereby situated emotions 
actively produce and reproduce the social world, including institutions, “social systems,” 
and “social practices.”  
The more general question for social theory is to draw all the implications of a 
conception of the human agent as not only knowledgeable but also sentient. Human 
agency is not only a matter of cognition, implicit skill, and explicit knowledge. It is also a 
matter of emotion, urges to act, and emotional transactions that change the environment. 
What is still missing is a cogent concept of motivation able to account for the familiar 
fact that emotion states carry with them the experience of being urged to act (or not to 
act) without reducing the understanding of this urge to a purely mechanical efficient 
cause.  
In this respect, Magda Arnold’s (1960) and Nico Frijda’s (1986) concept of “action 
tendency” provides initial guidance for the construction of a concept of emotional 
motivation integrating the causal connotation of the experience of being “pushed” or 
“urged” to act with the finalistic reference to specific aims or end states as integral to the 
experience of these “pushes” and “urges.” For example, action “pushed” by anger is 
action “pulled” by the end state of suppressing, harming, or destroying the annoying 
object. This line of thought could be fruitfully combined with Charles Taylor’s (1979) 
view that “the natural expression of wanting is trying to get.” There is no good theoretical 
reason to stipulate that behaviors “pulled” by end states cannot be at the same time 
behaviors “pushed” by motives, as the reference to “wanting” suggests in this well-
known citation.  
In fact, the very idea of situated emotion or emotional transaction presupposes this 
duality of simultaneously pulling and pushing states. In my view, with a well articulated 
concept of the duality of motive and intention in emotional agency we will be in a better 
position to draw the social theoretical implications of a revised conception of the human 
agent as not only knowledgeable but also sentient. 
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